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Abstract
In this article, which is embedded in the special issue of the Journal which focuses on the compara-
tive research project ‘Policing European Metropolises’, the general aim is to provide an answer 
to the research question: ‘Are underlying Anglo-American assumptions regarding trends towards 
plural policing recognisable in European local geographical settings’? Our underlying question in 
this article concerns whether or not the local empirical situation in Sofia differs from more general 
evolutions of policing in Europe. This article will inquire specifically about the (national) influence 
of a ‘country in transition’ (Bulgaria) on the territory of the city of Sofia. For reasons of feasibility 
the article is limited to an exploration of the organisation of Bulgarian police. The following main 
questions are answered in this article: (1) What is the nature of the division between the national 
police apparatus and local policing bodies?, (2) Are tendencies towards fragmentation and centrali-
sation determined at the same time? and (3) Are tendencies towards private governance present 
within the public domain? Answering these questions requires an exploration of the historical 
and contextual background, so that insight into the related Bulgarian realities, particularly those 
of Sofia, might be gained. This article explores the official arrangements regarding the policing of 
crime and disorder in Sofia; it is based on desktop research, mostly internal research from the 
Ministry of the Interior. In the concluding section, the article summarises the different aspects 
of policing security in Sofia, framing the reality of this city within the article’s theoretical starting 
points regarding security governance and plural policing.
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 1. Introduction
This article is embedded in the special issue of the Journal which focuses on the 
comparative research project ‘Policing European Metropolises’. The general aim 
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of this project is to provide an answer to the following central research question: 
‘Are underlying Anglo-American assumptions regarding trends towards plural polic-
ing recognisable in European local geographical settings’? As a starting point in this 
comparative research, researchers within the project have been asked to provide an 
overview of the key issues and challenges related to policing European metropolises 
in the early twenty-first century and to place these in their broader institutional 
and historical contexts, particularly for a broad European readership that may be 
unfamiliar with the governing arrangements that structure policing in particular 
cities (Edwards & Prins, in this issue). The aim of the project, in analysing different 
cities, is neither to seek for universality nor for uniqueness, but rather for a critical 
realist method of articulation that recognises the contextual nature of governance and 
of its various objects of control (Edwards & Hughes, 2005, 347). The ambition is to 
deepen understanding of the ‘geo-historical approach’ (Edwards & Hughes, 2005) 
in the course of comparing safety-oriented governance in Europe with empirical 
research data. In spite of a huge amount of research focusing on comparisons 
among countries (Brodeur, 1995; Brogden & Nijhar, 2005; Jones & Newburn, 2006; 
Wisler & Onwudiwe, 2009; Lemieux, 2010; Nelken, 2011; Terpstra, Stokkom & 
Spreeuwers, 2013; Hoogenboom, 1991), comparing the governance of cities is an 
innovative research objective. In order to compare different approaches to policing 
in metropolises within Europe, an extensive standardised checklist was designed 
and submitted to the various authors, so that the empirical data could be collected 
in a structured way.
Our underlying question in this article concerns whether or not the local empirical 
situation in Sofia differs from more general evolutions of policing in Europe. Indeed, 
there exists a huge Anglo-Saxon body of literature on police and policing, but 
literature on policing in Eastern European countries is rather scarce. During the 
1980s police authorities in Central and Eastern European Countries were shrouded 
in secrecy and very little information was published even on basic police apparatus 
features. Any interests from citizens in this issue could have resulted in being 
arrested (Meško, Fields, Lobnikar & Sotlar, 2013). Furthermore, according to Sten-
ning (2009, 23), ‘Accountability of policing has remained stubbornly polarized between 
research and writing on the governance of ‘the police’ on the one hand, and a largely 
separate (and much smaller) literature mainly bemoaning an alleged lack of adequate 
and effective governance and public accountability of ‘private security’ on the other’. 
More importantly, Stenning (2009, 23) stipulates that ‘The challenge of developing a 
holistic conception of governance and accountability that might be appropriate for the 
‘plural policing’ environment of the 21st century has been largely ignored by policing 
scholars and policy makers alike’. In order to contribute in a modest way to this body 
of knowledge, this article will inquire specifically about the (national) influence of 
a ‘country in transition’ (Bulgaria) on the territory of the city of Sofia. The purpose 
of the project is to contribute to a European multi-layered governance theory on urban 
control of crime and social disorder. Issues exploring the nature of relationships 
within and between partner agencies, with a view to enhancing understanding 
of contemporary policing culture (O’Neill & Loftus, 2013), can be interesting and 
useful for constructing a network governance theory on urban control.
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The Metropolises project aims to grasp the empirical reality of urban security 
governance. According to Edwards and Hughes (2013), this concept has been used 
to describe social and economic responses to certain problems of street crime, civil 
unrest and social cohesion. This article will not explore urban security in such a 
broad sense, and will, for reasons of feasibility1, be limited to an exploration of the 
organisation of Bulgarian police. The following main questions are consequently 
answered in this article: (1) What is the nature of the division between the national 
police apparatus and local policing bodies?, (2) Are tendencies towards fragmenta-
tion and centralisation determined at the same time? (Edwards & Hughes, 2005; 
Prins, Cachet, Ponsaers & Hughes, 2012) and (3) Are tendencies towards private 
governance present within the public domain? (Jones & Newburn, 1999; Hope, 
2000; Johnston & Shearing, 2003; Hope & Karstedt, 2003; Johnston & Stenning, 
2010; Goold, Loader & Thumala, 2010). Answering these questions requires an 
exploration of their historical and contextual background, so that insight into the 
related Bulgarian realities, particularly those of Sofia, might be gained.
This article explores the official arrangements regarding the policing of crime 
and disorder in Sofia; it is based on desktop research, mostly internal research from 
the Ministry of the Interior. Its main sources of information are quantitative and 
qualitative data from governmental sources, (national and local) laws and regula-
tions, and studies that were conducted by the Center for the Study of Democracy 
(CSD) in Bulgaria. Governmental sources of information are mainly formal and legal 
documents from the Ministry of the Interior, the regulations of which stipulate its 
activities and main tasks as well as the structures and bodies of governance within 
the internal administration. In addition to that, we have requested and obtained 
information from the Metropolitan Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior2.
The article is structured as follows. In the first (theoretical) section, insight is 
provided into global governance tendencies within nations, as they are described 
in the broader context of public sector reform in Western Europe. Elements of the 
urban sociology theory of security governance are explored in order to provide a 
theoretical framework for understanding the situation in Sofia. In the second sec-
tion, the authors provide an overview of the institutional and historical contexts of 
Bulgaria and Sofia, in order to achieve a greater understanding of the realities of 
policing security in Sofia. Bulgaria can be called ‘a country in transition’ (Ciobanu, 
2010). The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 symbolised the beginning of the process 
of embracing democratic ideas and the initiation of a complex transition process 
(Mesko, Fields, Lobnikar & Sotlar, 2013). Special subsections are devoted to the sub-
stantial urbanisation processes Bulgaria underwent as well as the extremist attacks 
and disturbances that occurred simultaneously. In the third section, we discuss the 
Bulgarian constitutional framework of the national police system, the territorially 
1 Gathering the data was a very time-consuming process. Scholarly work on policing in Sofia is very 
scarce: most websites are not available in English and special permission to receive information 
has to be received from the Minister of the Interior. In particular, finding information related to 
policing on regional and local levels was very difficult.
2 In order to obtain data, we needed to send official letters from the university. The information we 
requested was delivered in turn via personal letters.
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organised regional police and the municipal police structure that operates in Sofia. 
In the fourth section, other actors who provide security are discussed, specifically the 
mayor and private actors who operate within the city. In the concluding section, the 
article summarises the different aspects of policing security in Sofia, framing the 
reality of this city within the article’s theoretical starting points regarding security 
governance and plural policing.
 2. Theoretical insights on governance evolutions in Western Europe
‘Policing’ in the title of this article refers to police work in the broadest sense, includ-
ing that which is done by agencies other than the regular police force (Terpstra; 
Stokkom & Spreeuwers, 2013). ‘Policing’ can be defined as ‘Intentional action 
involving the conscious exercise of power or authority (by an individual or organisation) 
that is directed towards rule enforcement, the promotion of order or assurances of safety’ 
(Crawford, Lister, Blackburn & Burnett, 2005, 4). As Loader (2000, 324) states, 
‘We are living in the midst of a potentially far-reaching transformation in the means 
by which order and security are maintained in liberal democratic societies, one that is 
giving rise to the fragmentation and diversification of policing provision, and ushering 
in a plethora of agencies and agents, each with particular kinds of responsibility for the 
delivery of policing and security services and technologies. What we might call a shift from 
police to policing has seen the sovereign state – hitherto considered focal to both provision 
and accountability in this field – reconfigured as but one node of a broader, more diverse 
‘network of power’’. Steering mechanisms appearing within late modernity that were 
designed to shift ‘government’ to ‘governance’ have been described by many scholars 
(Osborne & Gaebler, 1993; Rhodes, 1996; Kooiman, 1999; Newman, 2001; Garland, 
2001; Crawford, 2002; 2004; Crawford, Lister & Wall, 2003; Ostrom, 2005; Crawford 
& Lister, 2006; 2007). Liberal democratic polities became increasingly differentiated 
as public administration systems expanded to encompass more competencies and 
as they simultaneously responded to pressures calling for greater intervention in 
civil society (Rhodes, 1997, in Edwards & Hughes, 2005, 351). Emphasis lay on 
active citizenship, a concept that redefines citizenship as being about rights and 
responsibilities (Brannan, John & Stoker, 2006). It insists on the need for local 
communities and local actors to take up greater shares in and responsibility for the 
regulation and enforcement of local community life (Lippens, 2008). The dominant 
idea in this regard was to ‘break away from old bureaucratic modes of integral service 
provision and [to replace] these by more flexible market and customer-oriented methods of 
public service delivery’ (van der Meer, 2009, 174). As well: ‘Governance is also regarded as 
a means of restoring the authority of government agencies by empowering private citizens 
to participate more directly in their own government’ (Edwards & Hughes, 2009, 354).
As well as promoting citizen participation, the neoliberal approach and the New 
Public Management led to ‘reinventing government’ (Osborne & Gaebler, 1993), 
meaning that ‘governance [was] no longer monopolised by states’, or characterised 
by ‘rule-at-a-distance’ (Johnston & Shearing, 2003) or ‘hollowing out of the state’ 
(Rhodes, 1994). The classic model of authority was replaced by horizontal forms of 
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governance in which private (Kempa, Stenning & Wood, 2004; Hope & Sparks, 2000) 
and public actors seek to co-produce policy (Prins & Cachet, 2011). New concepts, 
such as risk control, commercial arrangements, cost and benefit analyses, efficiency, 
effectiveness, customer-oriented practices and output targeting, accompanied this 
trend (Crawford et al., 2003; Crawford & Lister, 2006; Downes & Van Swaaningen, 
2007). The traditional Weberian model of the interfering welfare state no longer 
provided a solution for the increasingly diverse, complex and dynamic circumstances 
of late modern society (Devroe, 2013).
The centralised state, with its bureaucratic power mechanisms, lost its ruling 
position in favour of decentralisation, which distributes authority among lower 
levels. Public sector reforms pertained to changes in the distribution of power 
and to the division of central, territorial and functional authority among various 
decentralised forms of government (Meer, 2009). ‘Forms of control are increasingly 
inscribed into the fabric of local territorial and spatial interactions’ (Robert, 2002, in 
Crawford, 2002, 27). Local security policy strove for partnerships and for local 
preventative strategies (Johnston & Shearing, 2003) developed by networks among 
police, private security, military and secret intelligence agencies (Reiner, 2000). 
These networks include ‘all those interactive arrangements in which public as well 
as private actors participate aimed at solving societal problems, or creating societal 
opportunities, and attending to the institutions within which these governing activities 
take place’ (Kooiman, 1999, 70).
The concept of ‘governance of security’ includes responses to criminal events that 
have already taken place: ‘anticipating and seeking to prevent threats that might occur’ 
(Johnston & Shearing, 2003, 32). Different actors enter the public space in order 
to keep public order. More precisely, attention paid to policy regarding a stringent 
‘politics of behaviour’ (Field, 2003) and ‘defining deviance down’ (Garland, 2001) was 
a result of a shifting of the authority of national law enforcement agencies to local 
partners and citizens, called ‘relocalisation’ (Crawford, 2002) or ‘plural policing’ 
(Loader, 2000; Crawford, Lister, Blackburn & Burnett, 2005; Jones & Newburn, 2006; 
Row, 2014). Other concepts used in Anglo-Saxon literature are ‘local multi-agency 
partnerships’ (Crawford, 1997; MacLaughlin, 2002), ‘multi-agency approach’, ‘com-
munity safety policy’ (Crawford, 1999; Brannan et al., 2007), ‘networked governance’, 
‘urban governance’ and ‘multi-layered or multilevel governance’ (Loader, 2000).
Local security issues have local expressions, especially in the densely populated 
urban centres of Europe, but their origins often lie far beyond these cities. Threats to 
urban security are also associated with the austere economic environment confront-
ing urban populations in Europe as a consequence of the financial crisis of 2008 
and of the related sovereign debt problems encountered by many EU member states 
(Edwards & Hughes, 2013). In times of crisis, there would seem to be a risk that 
police services will be pressured to adopt a very narrow idea of policing (Millie & 
Bullock, 2013), and that they will as a result try to outsource additional police tasks 
to private companies. Indeed, since the early 1990s patrolling, guardianship and 
the enforcement of law and order have no longer been seen as the exclusive tasks 
of the police (Terpstra et al., 2013). As an alternative to a ‘monopoly of control by 
the police’, Loader (2000) mentions a complex future in which alliances of public, 
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parochial and private agencies and interests coexist, sometimes drawn together in 
intricate networks of policing that seek to provide public reassurance. Local policing 
is becoming increasingly organised and is being delivered through a multiplicity of 
purchaser and provider arrangements. New forms of additional policing, referred 
to as the ‘extended police family’ (Johnston, 2003) have emerged. Though there has 
been no single police ‘position’ on the governance of plural policing in Britain, an 
influential model (‘the police extended family’) (Home Office, 2001) has arisen 
‘because of concern in some places that municipal governments might opt to set up their 
own police forces, thereby posing a threat of ‘Balkanization’ (Blair, 2002, in Johnston, 
2003, 185). This ‘family’ includes subcontracted police and community support 
officers, municipal guards, neighbourhood and street wardens, estate rangers, 
caretakers and concierges, as well as private security guards and citizen patrols 
(Zedner, 2003; Crawford & Lister, 2006).
 3. Historical evolutions and contexts within Bulgaria
 3.1. Bulgaria
Bulgaria is located in the south-eastern portion of Europe; it is the 14th largest 
country in the entire continent. It is currently home to a total of 7.3 million residents, 
the majority of these being Christians. ‘Despite certain hesitations and distrust, the 
period between national independence and the end of the First World War (1878-1918) 
was generally marked by a strong pro-European orientation of the Bulgarian state’ 
(Daskalov, 2004, 46). This drastically changed in 1918. As a member of the losing 
side in the first World War, Bulgaria had to concede to humiliating peace treaties, 
which were perceived in the country as a national catastrophe (Zhelyazkova, Kosseva 
& Toleran, 2010). Henceforth, Europe was no longer an attractive and desired role 
model for the Bulgarian nation. Bulgarian nationalism has been largely a hybrid, 
containing elements of both German cultural and ethnic nationalism and French 
civic nationalism. After World War II, Bulgaria became a Communist country 
and a loyal member of the Soviet bloc. In sharp contrast to its post-independence 
period (late 19th century), when Bulgaria was struggling to ‘return to Europe’ and 
when its European identity and heritage were strongly emphasised, the political 
discourse, literature and social sciences of the post-WWII Bulgaria completely 
lacked any reference to European identity or European orientation (Zhelyazkova, 
Kosseva & Toleran, 2010). Instead, Slavic identity was emphasised, highlighting 
the closeness of Bulgaria and the Soviet/Russian nation in terms of origin and 
culture. In February 1990 the Communist Party, forced by street protests, gave up 
its claim on power, and in June 1990 the first free elections since 1931 were held; 
these were won by the Bulgarian Socialist Party (the new name of the Communist 
Party). In July 1991 a new constitution was adopted, stipulating a representative 
elected President as well as a Prime Minister and a Cabinet.
On 1 January 2007, Bulgaria joined the European Union, becoming one of its 
newest members. Despite being an EU member, Bulgaria’s position in the Union 
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is still not equal to those of older member states. Bulgaria (along with Romania) 
is subject to strict monitoring and control exercised by the European Commission 
over issues of corruption and organised crime (Zhelyazkova, Kosseva & Toleran, 
2010). The situation in Bulgaria — one of the least corrupt countries in 2007 — has 
deteriorated dramatically: in 2010 there was more corruption in the country than 
there had been before (Ganev, 2013).
‘In the aftermath of Bulgaria’s entry in the EU, competitive rent seeking was supplanted 
by cronyism. This shift constitutes a turning point in a peculiar evolutionary cycle 
that began after the collapse of one-party regimes in 1989. During the first decade of 
post-communism, cronyism was prevalent. One of the arguments that encounter no 
dissent is that in Bulgaria and Romania assets previously owned by the state were 
distributed among strategically located members of the communist nomenklatura. In 
both countries, the former communists retained power and reinvented themselves as 
capitalists — while successfully keeping local and foreign competitors at bay’ (Ganev, 
2013, 29).
With a 12% unemployment rate and a mainly elderly population, Bulgaria holds 
the tenth place on the list of the top ten ‘most poverty-ridden countries’3 in Europe. 
This list is based on each country’s per capita gross domestic product4 (GDP), as 
determined in 2012 by the Central Intelligence Agency fact book5. The current 
minimum wage in Bulgaria is 174 euros per month6. The economic changes after 
1989 have had serious consequences on the standard of living of the vast majority 
of the Bulgarian population (Ivanov, 1998). The deep economic crisis faced by the 
country is more severe in the regions with ethnically mixed communities. The 
socialist economy created small firms to offer employment to the population, but the 
industries were new and not well established (Falaris, 2004). The years of transition 
have led to the failure of these firms as they were not competitive and faced many 
difficulties in supply of resources (Pickles & Berg, 2000).
Bulgaria is a multicultural country, containing over 15 ethnic communities. The 
largest group is native Bulgarians (84,8% according to the 2011 census), followed 
by Turks (8,8%) and Roma (4.9%)7. A prevailing perception of the country as a 
mono-national state has resulted in correspondingly prejudicial policies towards 
the minority groups. They have been accepted as part of Bulgarian society, but at 
the same time in practice have been highly marginalised (Zhelyazkova, Kosseva & 
3 http://www.therichest.com/rich-list/poorest-list/the-10-most-poverty-ridden-countries-in-europe/ 
last consulted on May, 30 2014. 
4 These numbers were determined by dividing the country’s GDP by the population of the country, 
thus providing a rough estimate of the income of an individual person within that country.
5 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2221.html, last consulted on 
May, 30 2014. 
6 Compare to a minimum wage of 1921 euros per month in the richest EU country, Luxembourg: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Minimum_wage_statistics, last 
consulted on May, 30 2014. 
7 2011 Census conducted by National Institute for Statistics: http://www.nsi.bg/sites/default/files/
files/pressreleases/Census2011final.pdf 
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Toleran, 2010). Roma live mostly in segregated settlements at the edges of cities and 
towns, while the majority of Turks and Pomaks (another minority ethnic group) 
reside in peripheral rural regions. In this way, they remain largely invisible in the 
everyday lives of the majority of the population.
State socialist nationalization policies in the 1980s severely impacted the ethnic 
Turkish and Muslim regions of Bulgaria, while neo-liberal economic strategies 
have subsequently further deepened their economic crisis. Unemployment among 
Roma is the highest of all minorities, between 60 and 65 per cent (Gallie, Kostova, 
Kuchar & Thomlinson, 1996, 63-78). This tendency is confirmed by recent research. 
The empirical data from a survey on a representative sample of 2,066 people in 
March 2000 shows that 55 per cent of the Roma and 48 per cent of the Turks are 
not employed (Kolev, 2000, 10). According to the Roma themselves, unemployment 
is the basic economic problem for their community. They explain the high rate of 
unemployment with their low education. There are also a significant number of 
Roma who tend to think that unemployment is due to ethnic discrimination (Gallie 
et al. 1996). In Central and Eastern Europe and especially in Southeastern Europe, 
the vacuum created by the collapse of the communist ideology has often been filled 
by a nationalist ideology. As a counter reaction, the minorities are demanding greater 
recognition of their rights. This has led to numerous conflicts in the region. Ethnic 
groups are officially recognised in the Bulgarian constitution, with official policy 
aiming at integration.
Bulgaria has an extremely low crime rate compared to other EU countries8. Accord-
ing to Nikolay Radulov (2012), the low crime rate registered is a result of the loss 
of public trust in Bulgarian police. While a 6% decrease is registered yearly (in the 
period of 2010-2012), the latent crime rate has increased with the same percentage. 
This could also be due to inadequacies in the system for crime registration (Radulov, 
2012). Central and Eastern European countries are characterised by low crime 
rates, the results of the artificially maintained employment created by policymakers 
during the rule of Communism. By focusing on maintaining full employment and 
low prices for basic foods, these reforms tended to reveal the inadequacies of the 
system instead of helping to develop it. As early as 1982, however, it became clear 
that the depoliticisation of socialist economies and the partial abandonment of 
central planning, whether involving minimal or more extensive rationalisations of 
the managerial apparatuses of state enterprises, would lead to a serious weakening 
of the legitimacy of states (Ciobanu, 2010).
 3.2. Sofia
The largest city in Bulgaria is Sofia, its capital; it is the 15th largest city in the Euro-
pean Union, with a 2013 population of 1,301,683 citizens. Sofia is geographically 
8 The total number of crimes in Bulgaria from 2008 to 2012 was 206,483. This translates to 2,803 
crimes per 100,000 inhabitants. See the latest version of the European Sourcebook, covering the 
years 2003–2007: https://english.wodc.nl/onderzoeksdatabase/european-sourcebook-4e-editie.
aspx, and Killias and Rau (2000), to compare these rates with those of other EU countries.
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situated in western Bulgaria, at the northern foot of Vitosha Mountain, in the 
‘Sofia Valley’, which is surrounded by mountains on all sides. The city covers an 
area of 1344 km. Sofia can be described as a ‘city in transition’: it has expanded 
culturally, economically, demographically and physically at a very fast pace (Staddon 
& Mollov, 2000). In 1880, Sofia counted only 19,000 citizens. From that time until 
1997, the population in Sofia increased 54 times. This trend has continued during 
the past ten years9, due to migrations from smaller cities and villages all over the 
country10. Crime rates in Sofia are - as in Bulgaria overall - quite marginal11, and are 
not comparable to rates in other big cities in Europe. The total number of crimes 
reported by the police in Sofia from 2008 to 2012 was 12,64012. The crime rate was 
974.84 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants.
 3.2.1. Towards a substantial urbanisation
While during the decades preceding 1950 Sofia experienced the most dramatic 
increases in population in all of Bulgaria, it has long been a symbol of urbanisation 
in Bulgarian history. Before the liberation, Sofia’s territory expanded by only 2.8 
square kilometres, with 75% of its total area covered with building structures and 
surrounded by security dikes (Vassilev, 2001). The city expanded and gradually 
urbanised its vicinities in all directions, resulting in a 4.2 square kilometre increase 
by 188713. In the period between 1900 and 1946, migration to Sofia reached its 
peak, triggering an expansion that increased the city’s population from 68,000 
inhabitants in 1900 to half a million inhabitants in 1946. This evolution led to 
increasing urbanisation. This systematic beginning suffered a setback as a result of 
the demographic crisis after World War I, which was caused by an unprecedented 
wave of migrations from Macedonia, Thrace, Dobrudsha and Morava. A key factor 
in the urbanisation process was the creation of an important railway juncture at 
the end of the 20th century, which made travel from Western Europe to Istanbul 
(via Belgrade and Sofia) possible. The building of factories and inns was another 
important urbanising factor. In 1930, urbanisation expanded towards some of 
the outlying villages, and Sofia’s territory reached 45 square kilometres. In the 
late 1970s, an inner city displacement took place, where those who could afford it 
moved from the centre of the city towards the outskirts (Doytchinov, 2004). The 
downtown area became less populated, and it gradually shifted into a seat for 
9 From a population of 1,237,891 in 2006, the number of residents in Sofia has steadily risen to 
1,240,788 in 2007, 1,247,059 in 2008, 1,249,798 in 2009, 1,259,446 in 2010 and 1,296,615 in 2011 
(http://www.sofia.bg/osnovni%20pokazateli.asp). Only in 2012 do we notice a decrease in popu-
lation, which was due to the negative birth rate (-1.2).
10 The largest numbers of migrants have come from the provinces of Pleven, Blagoevgrad, Vratsa, 
Veliko, Turnovo and Plovdiv (http://sofia-da.eu/bg/about-sofia/demographic-profile-of-sofia).
11 http://www.nsi.bg/otrasal.php?otr=25&a1=839&a2=883&a3=923#cont, last consulted on May, 30 
2014. 
12 http://www.nsi.bg/otrasal.php?otr=25&a1=839&a2=883&a3=923#cont, last consulted on May, 30 
2014. 
13 National Institute for Statistics: http://www.nsi.bg/otrasal.php?otr=19&a1=376&a2=377&a3=381
#cont last consulted on May, 30 2014. 
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numerous public and private institutions, including the ones dealing with security. 
In Communist Bulgaria, as in other Communist countries, urban planning was 
centralised, technocratic and subordinated to national economic objectives (Hirt, 
2005). ‘It proceeded within the institutional and ideological framework of a single-party 
system; limited local autonomy, which implied that local governments simply channeled 
down state decisions to the local level; and almost full state ownership of land, property 
and means of production. The latter meant that the state, through its agencies, was the 
sole developer of any land beyond the size of a single residential lot’ (Hirt, 2005, 222). 
Over the next four decades, Communist leaders developed Sofia into the political, 
economic and cultural capital of a rapidly industrialising nation. Communist-era 
plans show quite distinctly the vast areas of planned suburbs that were built to 
house the rapid influx of factory workers and government officials who answered 
the siren call of developing socialism (Staddon & Mollov, 2000).
After the Communist period, as Bulgaria became a democratic country, modern 
building construction started in the ‘transitional’ zone of the capital. This period 
was marked by widespread changes in social status and increasing differentiation 
among the poor, middle class and rich, which in turn resulted in building structures 
differentiated by class14. The city is practically surrounded by slums that have sprung 
up on undeveloped territory. Although the local authorities are now belatedly regulat-
ing some of these territories, they are hardly able to get the situation under control 
(Gigova, 2011). Last, but not least, national conditions and factors assist in providing 
an understanding of the city’s development. In its entire period as Bulgaria’s capital, 
Sofia has always been the location boasting the most dynamic development in the 
country. This fact has an economic, political and social explanation. The extremely 
important influence of the city on the country’s economic growth is the reason why 
the regional planning act defines it as a ‘growth area’ (Doytchinov, 2004). Sofia is 
now clearly entering a brave new phase in its development, a phase signalled by 
several high-profile consultation and strategic planning exercises. In 1997 the city’s 
popular mayor, Stefan Sofianski, commissioned the United Nations Development 
Programme to produce a ‘Human Development Report’ for Sofia, to serve as a 
marker of Sofia’s strengths, weaknesses, challenges and prospects for the decades 
to come (Staddon & Mollov, 2000).
 3.2.2. Terrorist attacks, protests and Syrian refugees
In this section we describe chronologically the main events that have occurred in 
Sofia that have had possible implications for its security policy. The terrorist attack at 
‘Saint Nedelya’ Church in 1925, the bombardment of the city by the Allied Forces in 
1943 and the terrorist attack at the Burgas Airport in 2012 shook Sofia upside down.
On 16th of April, 1925 Sofia becomes a scene of one of the worst terrorist attacks 
in Bulgarian history and, at that time, in the World. Twenty-five kilograms of 
explosive were smuggled, thanks to a bribed church employee, in the St. Nedelya 
Church where the burial of the prominent Bulgarian general Konstantin Georgiev 
14 http://www.sofia.bg/history.asp?lines=316&nxt=1&update=all last consulted on May, 30 2014.
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was to take place, attended by many prominent government guests. The explosion 
resulted in the killing of 213 people and nearly 500 were wounded, among them 
12 prominent military generals. The ‘Bloody Thursday’ had profound implications 
for the security in Sofia at that time. It resulted in the announcement of martial 
law, but the terrorist attack did not achieve its’ goal to bring down the Government.
In December 1941, Bulgaria declared war on the United Kingdom and the 
United States. The following series of Allied bombing raids on Sofia, which began 
on the 14th of November 1943 and ended on 17 April 1944, can be called another 
important event with profound implications for the city’s security (Gigova, 2011). 
This so-called operation ‘Point Blank’ included 11 sequences of indiscriminate 
shelling and bombardment of the civilian population of Sofia15. Another incident 
occurred decades later, in January 1997, when, due to economic hyperinflation, 
angry protestors started gathering in the square in front of the Bulgarian Parlia-
ment16. The situation got out of control when they angrily stormed the Parliament 
building. After these protests, peaceful protests involving only minor scuffles 
followed.
We must at least mention a very recent terrorist attack, which had, although the 
bombing did not take place in Sofia, significant implications and consequences 
for security at Sofia Airport. On 18 July 2012 a bus transporting Israeli tourists 
exploded, killing 7 people and injuring 35 at Burgas Airport. A later investigation 
conducted by the Bulgarian Ministry of the Interior and Europol linked Hezbollah 
to the bombings, naming the incident as ‘the group’s first successful terror attack 
in Europe since the mid-1980s’17. With the exception of this incident, the recent his-
tory of Sofia has not been marked by typical modern-day terrorist attacks. Protests, 
however, have continued to take place. As a result of high electricity bills, at the 
end of January 2013, Sofia, among other large Bulgarian cities, again became the 
site of protests18. An attempt to transport politicians out of the Parliament building 
by driving a bus through the crowd of protestors resulted in rocks being thrown 
and clashes with police; at least seven protestors and two officers were injured19. 
When the government resigned in February 2013, new legislative elections held in 
May 2013 were supported by 240 European observers. Despite the resignation of 
the government and the coming to power of a new coalition, in May 2013 protests 
against the new and allegedly corrupt government became even more intense. What 
followed were 281 days of protests, along with two occupations of Parliament as 
well as an occupation of Sofia University20.
15 Nearly 45,265 bombs were dropped, resulting in the deaths of 2,477 people (99% civilians) and the 
destruction of 12,500 buildings (with damages costing approximately 12 billion euros).
16 http://www.euronews.com/2013/07/24/bulgaria-protesters-tales-of-barricades-and-police-violence-, 
last consulted on May, 30 2014. 
17 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21342192, last consulted on May, 30 2014. 
18 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-21516658, last consulted on May, 30 2014. 
19 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-23430121, last consulted on May, 30 2014. 
20 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-23430121 and http://www.bbc.com/news/world-euro-
pe-25014732, last consulted on May, 30 2014. 
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Finally, in order to explore recent developments, we must mention the situation 
of Syrian refugees in Bulgaria. As a result of the Syrian war (started in 2011), more 
than 10,000 Syrian refugees have entered Bulgaria since June 2013. Human rights 
organisations predict that tens of thousands more will enter the country in the 
coming months21. The refugee influx has sparked security concerns and backlash 
from the nationalist party ‘Ataka’ and the Bulgarian Socialist Party, opposition 
of the former government of Boyko Borisov, demanding more effective border 
control. As a result, on the 16th of October 2013 the government approved the 
building of a 30 km security fence along the Bulgarian-Turkish border in an area 
where it had been difficult to detect immigrants entering the country22. Gripped 
by protests and internal problems, Bulgaria was unable to adequately address the 
refugee problem, which boosted nationalist sentiment in the country. A Nationalist 
Party of Bulgaria, including neo-Nazi and skinhead elements, was formed, with a 
mission of cleansing ‘Bulgaria from the foreign and alien immigrants’. This party 
established ‘civil patrols’ which very much resemble the patrols of the ‘Golden 
Dawn’ in Greece23. These ‘civil patrols’ are charged with the task of conducting ‘stop 
and search’ techniques on migrants. Some activists claim that the government has 
been complicit in establishing these patrols, which would represent an abdication 
of the institution in favour of its right-wing faction. After the establishment of the 
Nationalist Party, a 17-year-old Syrian refugee was stabbed in Sofia near a refugee 
camp. This was followed in January 2014 by a wave of attacks in Sofia, during which 
an Iraqi-Bulgarian was attacked in a shopping mall, a Cameroonian mother and 
child were assaulted by a neo-Nazi group and a Malian boy was beaten by a mob24.
In the following section we explore the police system in Bulgaria, and more 
specifically the police who operate in Sofia.
 4. The national police apparatus
The national police apparatus can be regarded as a heritage from the Communist 
party. In September 1944, Todor Zhivkov25 became head of the ‘Sofia police force’, 
which was, as an instrument of the Communist party, restyled as the ‘Narodna Milit-
siya’ (‘People’s Militia’). The Ministry of the Interior26 had always been a centralised 
institution during Communist rule, which ended on 3 April 199027. The Ministry 
of the Interior is a hierarchical and centralised institution charged with protecting 
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fighting against crime. The Ministry of the Interior is headed by the Minister of 
the Interior, who is the sole and central executive authority within the Ministry. 
The ‘Law on the Ministry of the Interior’ gives overwhelming supervisory powers 
over all police components to the Ministry of the Interior. In order to understand 
plural policing in Sofia, it is necessary to explore the organisational structure of this 
Ministry, which houses the national police who operate in the city. The Ministry of 
the Interior finances local police presence.
The following section is based on research of the websites of the Ministry of 
Interior and legislation related to it, correspondence with the Ministry and a visit 
to this institution in Sofia.
 4.1. The Ministry of the Interior and its centralised police system
All components of the Ministry of the Interior carry out common as well as unique 
preventative activities with respect to transgressions of the law, and when neces-
sary they issue notices or orders to national agencies, organisations and juridical 
persons in order to dictate sanctions28. The Ministry of the Interior is a central body 
as well as a decentralised one (as it operates and maintains a presence in each of 
the different regions of the country). We will describe the different sections of the 
Ministry shortly, as they are relevant to important security issues in Sofia.
The Ministry of the Interior is divided into three separate administrations: (1) the 
General Directorate, (2) the Regional Directorates and (3) the Specialised Directorates29. 
The regional directorates are situated in the various regions of Bulgaria, while the 
General Directorates and the Specialized directorates are situated in Sofia. Very 
recently (in 2013), major changes were made to this organisational structure. 
First of all, officers from the General Directorate’s ‘Fight against Organised Crimes’ 
division began working as part of the recently established National Security Agency. 
In addition, the Specialised Directorate for Operative and Technical Operations was 
restructured and renamed the National Agency for Technical Operations30. It became 
the national specialised directorate for secret operational and technical activities that 
are conducted for the purpose of protecting national and public security as well 
as the rights and freedoms of citizens. This unit can be regarded as an intelligence 
service, as it carries out the provision, development and application of special intel-
ligence instruments31. The most important consequence of these changes is the fact 
that both of the above-mentioned directorates are no longer part of the Ministry of 
the Interior, but belong (since 2013) to the National Security Agency, an intelligence 
28 Article 149 of the Law of the Ministry of the Interior.
29 http://www.mvr.bg/Za_MVR/struktura.htm
30 This National Agency for Technical Operations consists of the following Directorates: Internal 
Security, Migration, Bulgarian Identity Documents, International Projects, Property Control and 
Social Activities, National System, and Coordination of the Fight against Infringements Affecting 
the Financial Interests of the European Union.
 See http://www.mvr.bg/Za_MVR/struktura.htm and http://lex.bg/laws/ldoc/2135516991.
31 Article 137a, paragraph 1, and further. The agency’s legal competencies can be found under Article 
137b; see http://lex.bg/laws/ldoc/2135516991.
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department that deals with threats to internal security. Reforms to this structure 
will be effected along with changes to the current Law on the Ministry of the 
Interior (and the statute for its application); a new bill regarding these matters is 
scheduled to be voted on in Parliament in September 2014. This bill will restructure 
the directorates and units within the Ministry of the Interior and will assign new 
competencies and functions to some of the directorates. The division between the 
national police who are governed by the Ministry of the Interior and the police 
officers who operate within the new intelligence services is not clear today, nor are 
the identities of the agencies or oversight bodies in control of this new National 
Security Agency. The organisation of this new framework of control and the resulting 
consequences for democracy are extensively important to any follow-up research 
that is conducted. Drawing conclusions from these new arrangements, we notice a 
shift of state police functions towards the intelligence services, so that these functions are 
no longer operating under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior, nor being 
controlled by this institution.
Last, but not least, the Ministry of the Interior has not lost its grip on the big 
city. One of the 28 Regional Directorates (named the ‘Metropolitan Directorate’) is 
centralised (and financed) by the Ministry of the Interior but operates within the city 
of Sofia. Let us first describe the directorate that steers and organises the national 
police, namely, the National Police General Directorate (NPGD).
 4.2. The National Police General Directorate (NPGD)
The National Police Directorate is located within the first General Directorate. The 
directors of this administration execute orders that are issued by the Minister of 
the Interior or by his or her deputy ministers, and are accountable to them32. This 
directorate is a national specialised structure that focuses on information analysis 
and operational, investigative, preventative, and organisational activity related to 
the prevention, detection and investigation of criminal offenses, except in the area 
of organised crime.
 4.2.1. The Specialised Police Forces
Regional offices of this department are called ‘Specialised police departments’ 
or ‘Specialised Police Forces’, the latter of which is a new name for the (former) 
‘Gendarmerie’33. These locally and regionally embedded forces exist to protect public 
order, provide security for mass events, protect critical facilities and strategic and 
diplomatic buildings, conduct special operations and assist in emergency situations. 
They are present in the following cities: Sofia, Montana, Pleven, Plovdiv, Burgas, 
Varna and Kardzali.
32 Article 20 of the Law of the Ministry of the Interior.
33 http://gdnp.mvr.bg/Pravomoshtia_GDNP/default.htm
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 4.2.2. The Border Police General Directorate (BPGD)
This Directorate maintains a local presence in all airports as well as in the following 
cities: Burgas, Dragoman, Elhovo, Kyustendil, Ruse and Smolyan. The BPGD guards 
the air borders of the Republic of Bulgaria, including those of Sofia’s airspace. It also 
coordinates  border crossing activity within the two terminals of Sofia International 
Airport34.
 4.2.3. The Fire Safety and Protection of the Population Metropolitan Directorate (FSPPMD)
Thirdly, the Fire Safety and Protection of the Population Metropolitan Directorate 
(FSPPMD) is locally present in all main regional cities in Bulgaria. The FSPPMD 
protects the population of Sofia from fire hazards and, in the absence of such 
disasters, concentrates on prevention via training and information campaigns35.
 5. The regional directorates
Besides the national directorates, the Ministry of the Interior maintains regional 
directorates in all (28) main regional cities in Bulgaria. Regional directorates are 
led by directors who are subordinate to the Minister and the Chief Secretary of the 
Ministry of the Interior36. As the Metropolitan Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior 
is one of the 28 regional directorates that explicitly operates in Sofia, we will focus 
in depth on this policing department.
 6. The local police apparatus: The Metropolitan Directorate (MDMI)
Mainly safeguarding the population of Sofia, this directorate oversees the territory 
of Sofia, including three additional cities and 34 villages that are located in the city’s 
vicinity. The directorate conducts operational, investigative and security activities 
within the city. The MDMI has a centralised structure; it is governed by the Director 
General, who is directly subordinate to the Chief Secretary of the Ministry of the 
Interior. The Metropolitan Directorate consists of multiple departments, units and 
groups, as well as nine city district offices37. It includes two main sub-directorates: 
one that is in charge of the Criminal Police (focusing on criminal investigations) 
and one that is in charge of the Security Police (focusing on public order and crime 
prevention). Officers are divided among different units and the total number of 
officers (on payroll38) in the MDMI is 5,463. Police density in Sofia is 350 public 
police officers per 100,000 people. The MDMI also integrates public civil servants into 
34 http://www.nsgp.mvr.bg/History/third_period.htm
35 http://sofia-fire.bg/content.php?cat=2&subcat=2&id=5&m=0
36 Article 29a of the Law of the Ministry of the Interior (http://lex.bg/laws/ldoc/2135516991).
37 Article 12 from the regulations for application of the Law of the Ministry of the Interior.
38 The real number of officers currently working is less than the number who are on the payroll.
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its staff. Security activity within the MDMI takes place within several specific units, 
such as the ‘Centre for City Mobility’ department, the Centre for Alcohol Abusers and 
for Temporary Accommodation of Adults, the Municipal Police and the ‘Metropolitan’ 
unit. Parts of these units are outsourced, with the following parties playing the 
roles of providers: the metropolitan municipality of Sofia, Metropolitan Inc. and 
Sofia Water. In the following subsections, we describe these different units, paying 
particular attention to the police.
 6.1. The ‘Centre for City Mobility’ department
Officers from the ‘Centre for City Mobility’ department can react to infringements of 
the law perpetrated by road traffic, or they can act according to specific orders from 
the mayor of Sofia. In both of these cases, they also have the authority to initiate 
administrative sanctions or to forcefully remove motor vehicles that are hindering 
traffic or snow removal during events.
 6.2. The Centre for Alcohol Abusers and for Temporary Accommodation of Adults
This centre has a purely preventative task: it executes humanitarian activities, espe-
cially during the winter season, which are aimed at locating homeless individuals, 
beggars and individuals who are drunk or in a helpless condition and providing 
them with shelter in temporary housing centres.
 6.3. The Municipal Police and the ‘Metropolitan’ unit
The Municipal Police and the ‘Metropolitan’ unit perform the classical police task 
of ‘keeping the peace’ (Brodeur, 1998) and can be compared to the administrative 
public order police of most European countries (Ponsaers, 2001). These local police 
perform activities related to safeguarding public order, maintaining the security of 
sites and of municipality properties, ensuring the safety of traffic and assisting 
with the control and administrative activities of local and self-governing bodies 
within the metropolitan municipality. Officers also act as security agents for cultural 
and sporting events, as well as guaranteeing the safety of graveyards, recreation 
centres for citizens, and other crowded public sites. During the winter season they 
coordinate snow removal from streets and the removal of ice formations from 
municipality and national buildings.
This unit is organised across the nine police districts. A total of 84 teams are 
operational on behalf of all inhabitants of Sofia. Their tasks consist mainly of 
surveillance and control within the city. Police cars and foot patrols (beat officers) 
patrol on a daily basis in Sofia. Their numbers vary depending on the operational 
situation. Therefore, the perimeters of the territories in which these foot and car 
patrols function, as well as their numbers, vary with each police district. Car patrols 
vary between 34 and 38 on a daily basis, and foot patrols vary between 8 and 16 
pairs of officers who patrol each day.
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The Security Police within this unit can provide up to seven additional pairs of 
patrol officers for complicated operational situations and crisis situations, and in 
cases where mass riots occur. The Municipal Police possess four units of mounted 
police (on horses), as well as police officers accompanied by dogs, who are tasked 
with providing security in parks and during sporting events. Five additional pairs of 
motorcycle patrols and 14 car patrols are tasked with supplementarily safeguarding 
sites (residential buildings, trade properties, offices, banks, etc.). Prevention is their 
main task. Their duties also include safeguarding the metropolitan metro, which is 
of strategic importance. Security of the metro includes surveillance of the stations 
and the equipment in them, preventing terrorist attacks and violations of public 
order, and assisting in cases of civilian accidents. The security police division also 
performs analogous activities with respect to malicious violations or epidemic 
outbreaks in the lakes that supply water to Sofia and in the areas around district 
water treatment stations.
 7. Other actors providing security
 7.1. The role of the mayor: the local story
In order to explore tendencies towards plural policing in Sofia, we first analyse 
the legal powers the mayor has to recruit (local) actors other than the (nationally 
governed) police to provide security in the city. The mayor in Sofia is directly elected 
by the population for a period of four years39. At this moment, Jordanka Asenova 
Fandakova is the mayor of Sofia; she was elected on 15 November 2009, and again 
re-elected in 2011. She is the first woman to hold this position. As is the case in most 
cities within EU countries, the mayor is responsible, on the city level, for executing 
the security tasks that stem from the Acts of the President of the country and from 
the Council of the Ministry of the Interior40. After Bulgaria became a democracy, 
different political parties have influenced policymaking in the security domain 
via the National Parliament41. The mayor has executive power over the Acts that 
are voted on in Parliament42, which can be regarded as an indirect instrument of 
executing security-related policies. The mayor also has access to direct policymaking 
instruments concerning security, as established in the Law for local self-governance 
and local administration43. The mayor is responsible for organising governance in 
39 Article 38, subparagraph 2 (Law for local self-governance and local administration).
40 Article 44, paragraph 8 (Law for local self-governance and local administration).
41 Each party influences the agenda of its respective member of Parliament who decides to run in 
elections for the position of mayor of Sofia.
42 Article 38 (Law for local self-governance and local administration).
43 Provisions for direct policymaking instruments can be found in article 44, subparagraph 4, of the 
Law for local self-governance and local administration, which was installed on 17.09.1991, and 
very recently amended on 05.03.2014 (http://www.lex.bg/bg/laws/ldoc/2132580865).
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times of crisis44, and for keeping the peace, health, propriety and security of the 
city; these objectives are maintained via (written) communal orders.
Overall, Article 20 from the Law of the Ministry of Interior postulates that the direc-
tors of the general directorates fulfill orders issued by the Minister of Interior or his 
or her Deputy Ministers and are accountable to them. Article 29a states that regional 
directorates are being led by directors subordinate to the Minister of Interior and his 
or her Main Secretary (Bulgarian Ministry of Interior, 2013). This law gives supervisory 
authority to the Ministry of Interior of all police components. In contrast, according to 
Article 44, subparagraph 4 from the Law for Local Self-Governance and Administration 
‘the Mayor is responsible for the safeguarding of public peace and security, and for the 
purpose of it issues written orders, which are compulsory for heads of police bodies 
to abide by’ (Bulgarian Council of Ministers, 2005). This, however, does not give the 
Mayor any supervisory powers. According to Article 21, paragraph 5, the Minister 
of Interior ‘drafts a proposal for the budget for the Ministry of Interior’ (Bulgarian 
Ministry of Interior, 2013, p. 7) and paragraph 6 states that he  ‘allocates the budget of 
the Ministry of Interior, manages financial and logistical support, and exercises control 
over the activity of persons responsible for the budget in the structures of the Ministry’ 
(Bulgarian Ministry of Interior, 2013, p. 7). In addition to that, according to Article 18 
paragraph 3, directors of regional and local police offices can appeal the orders from 
the Mayor in front of the Regional governor, who, in consultation with the Minister of 
Interior, may revoke the order (Bulgarian Ministry of Interior, 2013). He or she does 
not, however, decide on the budgets to be spent on security issues within the city. The 
implementation costs of state functions, such as the municipal police, are financed by 
the state budget45, which is based on local sources of revenue that are independent of 
the municipal budget46. The mayor him/herself is responsible for the organisation and 
implementation of the independent municipal budget47. In this sense, the mayor has 
no authority over the budget of national police operations within the city48.
These facts — that the mayor is unable to control the budgets of police operations 
within the city, and that he or she is completely dependent on the coordination and 
governing activities of the Ministry of the Interior — could create tension between 
local and national priorities (Devroe, 2012). Therefore, here we detail the options 
the mayor has for setting local priorities for the control of crime and social disorder 
within the city.
In the policy plan developed by Mayor Fandakova in 2009, the theme of ‘better 
public order and security’ appeared as a fourth level priority, after ‘transformation of 
Sofia into one of the European Union’s cultural centres’ (number one), ‘development 
and modernisation of engineering and transportation infrastructure’ (number two) and 
‘efficient, active and transparent financing of municipal projects and better management 
of commercial companies with municipal property and municipal participation’ (number 
44 Article 44, subparagraph 11, of the Law for local self-governance and local administration.
45 Article 54, paragraph 2 (Law for local self-governance and local administration).
46 Article 52, paragraph 1 (Law for local self-governance and local administration).
47 Article 44, paragraph 5 (Law for local self-governance and local administration).
48 http://www.kubrat.bg/bg/localgov/zmsma.pdf
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three)49. We notice that a Bulgarian political document50 states that the mayor 
renewed her priority list in 2011. The theme ‘for a secure city’ fell to the tenth and 
last priority, superseded by these themes: a ‘competitive and innovative city’ (number 
1), a ‘well-planned and organised city’ (number two), a ‘city with modern transport 
infrastructure’ (number three), a ‘city with new and convenient public transport’ 
(number four), a ‘clean and green city’ (number five), ‘sport, healthy and active life in 
the city’ (number six), a ‘friendly city for kids and young people’ (number seven), the 
‘European capital of culture’ (number eight) and a ‘city with efficient and high-quality 
services for citizens and businesses’ (number nine). However, further study of this 
document reveals that, although security holds the last place on the mayor’s top 
ten priority list, it is actually interwoven with other issues that are mentioned. The 
mayor includes plans to ‘increase police patrols and effective surveillance infrastructure 
in the city’ in priorities two and three. As we were not able to conduct interviews in 
Sofia, we can’t give the exact reason for this ‘undervaluation’ of security issues in 
the local policy plan. A rational explanation could be the lack of power, competence 
and budget wielded by the mayor regarding police matters; why promise a safe city 
if you are dependent on the goodwill of the Ministry of the Interior to allow police 
to prioritise safety in the city? Another explanation could lie in the political changes 
that Mayor Fandakova would like to accomplish, which would stand in contrast to 
the policies of the former mayor of Sofia, Boyko Borisov, a former policeman who 
overemphasised security during his time in office.
 7.2. Private Security Companies (PSC)
Bulgaria is catching up with other Eastern European countries in terms of privatis-
ing police functions51. We notice a steady growth since 1990 of private security 
agencies that operate in public space52. For the city of Sofia, national data53 show 
an increasing trend towards privatisation. It was impossible to obtain any data on 
the amount of contracts that have been granted to PSC in Sofia, but as 68% of all 
PSC in the country are present in Sofia, we believe that many contracts have been 
provided by the mayor and by citizens54. Although the use of legal force remains in 
the hands of the public police, this privatisation trend provides an answer to our third 
research question, and has important implications for the study of security-related 
governance in Sofia. In this section we explore the history, private police densities 
and tasks of the private security companies.
49 http://sofia-da.eu/about-sofia/priorities-for-development
50 http://www.gerb.bg/uf/pages/PROGRAMA_GERB_Final_sofiq_2011.pdf
51 National Institute of Justice (NIJ): http://www.csd.bg/fileSrc.php?id=1800. 
52 In 2005, for example, public contracts were awarded to private security agencies, which led to 5,816 
private security officers (personnel) that protected national and municipal entities in Bulgaria. In 
2009, 258 public contracts related to security were announced; in 2010, this number was 284, while 
in 2011 it was 246 and in 2012 it was 113.
53 Source: the Ministry of the Interior.
54 http://www.mvr.bg/NR/rdonlyres/BB205E93-73C7-4709-811D-F687981E8662/0/ZCHOD.pdf
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 7.2.1. History and legislation
Initially, Bulgarian private security companies (PSC) were closely related to organised 
crime. Since 2008, the Ministry of the Interior claims to have instituted regulations 
that have significantly decreased the influence of organised crime on these agencies, 
prevented corruption, and contributed towards their professionalisation55. This 
professionalisation has led to the commercial export of PSC services internationally, 
including to Iraq and other international companies operating in Bulgaria. The first 
legal provisions regulating the activities of PSC were introduced by the Ministry of 
the Interior in 1993. A specific article (81) that briefly defined the possible activities 
of PSC was included in the Law for the Ministry of the Interior. Between 1993 and 
2000 several non-licensed commercial companies popped up. In 2000, the Ministry 
of the Interior introduced the ‘Private Security Act’56. In 2004, the companies as well 
as the Ministry of the Interior proclaimed the Act outdated, and a new section was 
added57, stipulating mandatory licenses for all PSC; these licenses give them the 
ability to provide contract services. The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for 
providing these licenses. The National Police Directorate and the regional directorates 
of the Ministry of the Interior are responsible for supervising the enactment of the 
Law on Private Security Activity. Private security companies operating in Sofia are 
supervised by the Metropolitan Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior58. This 
control is exercised by means of an ‘Integrated Centre’ for licensing PSC activities59. 
As there are no legal requirements for the background checks of employees hired by 
PSC, there are still concerns that many PSC operate in the private security market 
without licenses60. From 2004 on, the Act has not been renewed. The domain of 
private policing in Bulgaria is not transparent, and relevant information and dates 
are hard to find.
 7.2.2. Private security density
In 2013, there were 2,432 registered PSC in Bulgaria with a license to operate61. 
These data only include ‘licensed’ PSC, and so we believe the number to be an 
underestimation, supposing that a number of non-licensed companies are operat-
ing in a grey area of legality. If we explore other geographical levels, we obtain the 
information that 832 PSC operate on the territory of Bulgaria (including Sofia), 
55 Source: documents of the Ministry of the Interior.
56 Law on Private Security Activity 2000 (Decree 1-79), instituted by the Ministry of the Interior.
57 In 2004, section 1-14 was added to the Law on Private Security Activity 2000.
58 Chapter 5, Article 41 of the Law on Private Security Activity.
59 This Centre maintains data on the number of licensed PSC and their activities, guarded sites and 
the number of security personnel guarding them, and the means/resources that are used to guard 
the sites (guns, cars, etc.).
60 http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/reports_and_stats/think_tanks/seesac_salw_and_private_se-
curity_companies_in_south_eastern_europe.pdf
61 After several official written demands sent to the Ministry of the Interior, we finally obtained this 
information from the National Police General Directorate, or, more precisely, the ‘Integrated Centre 
for Licensing PSC’, in a letter. These data are not public.
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and that 50 additional PSC operate within the regional territory of Sofia (including 
Sofia). Most importantly, 281 private security companies operate exclusively within 
the city of Sofia. This means that out of the 2,432 licensed PSC in Bulgaria, 68.42% 
(1,644 PSCs) of them are operating in the city (at least, this is what is officially 
stated by the Ministry). We assume that a broader amount of PSC are working in 
Sofia without being registered by the Ministry. This amounts to a private security 
density of 133.97 PSC per 100,000 citizens in Sofia. However, when it comes to 
the ratio of PSC personnel to police officers, Bulgaria holds second place in all of 
Europe (after Hungary), with a ratio of 2 PSC members for each police officer62.
 7.2.3. Collaboration with public police
In order to keep a watch on the collaboration between private and public police, 
the Law on Private Security Activity63 defines an official body whose purpose is to 
guarantee this collaboration. This ‘Advisory Body for Cooperation on Private Security 
Activity’ is called, in brief, the ‘Council’, and was installed next to the National 
Police Directorate. The Council is chaired by the deputy director of the National 
Police Directorate. Three representatives of PSC and three officers from the 
National Police Directorate can have a seat in this official body. The Council can 
outline and propose specific forms of collaboration between police officers and 
citizens who provide private security services, and it can also report the results 
of these collaborations64.
 7.2.4. Tasks
The tasks of PSC are similar to those of public police, and are oriented mostly 
towards crime prevention. These private firms obtain their contracts from private 
citizens as well as from the mayor. Most PSC have commercial websites and con-
tact information and are responsive to citizens’ enquiries and demands. The law 
stipulates that ‘Private security services shall be fulfilled in accordance with preventative 
activity based on the circumstances and conditions for transgression of the law in guarded 
objects’65. If a crime is committed, private security officers are obliged to report it to 
the prosecutor’s office and to the public police66.
The tasks of PSC cover the following types of services67:
62 Confederation of European Security Services, Vitosha Research, National Institute of Justice (NIJ): 
http://www.csd.bg/fileSrc.php?id=1800
63 Chapter 4 of the Law on Private Security Activity.
64 Article 37, subparagraph 2, of the Law on Private Security Activity. See http://www.mvr.bg/NR/
rdonlyres/BB205E93-73C7-4709-811D-F687981E8662/0/ZCHOD.pdf.
65 Article 3, paragraph 4, of the Law on Private Security Activity (http://www.mvr.bg/NR/rdonlyres/
BB205E93-73C7-4709-811D-F687981E8662/0/ZCHOD.pdf).
66 Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Law on Private Security Activity.
67 Article 5 of the Law on Private Security Activity (http://www.lex.bg/bg/laws/ldoc/2135479817). 
These services shall be conducted via technological security systems and via other auxiliary re-
sources: http://www.lex.bg/bg/laws/ldoc/2135479817.
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Only 15 out of 1,664 PSC operating on the territory of Sofia, work in the domains 
of private security for individuals (including security for property and belongings 
and security for precious consignments)68. An overwhelming 660 PSC are licensed 
to operate only in the domain of security for property69. Only 37 PSC are licensed 
to function in all domains (excluding self-defence)70. The Law on Private Security 
Activity stipulates that private security guards have the right to use physical force 
and auxiliary tools such as plastic and rubber truncheons and handcuffs71. We notice 
a strange note on the use of violence in the Law, where it stipulates that ‘In cases 
where guards detain individuals, use force, auxiliary tools or guns, they have to hand in 
a written report to their supervisor, who in turn is obliged to hand it in to the appropriate 
police agency’72. Is this a legal contradiction? The Law stipulates that the public 
police have a monopoly on violence, but, on the other hand, violence (in the form 
of handcuffs, guns and arrests) can and will be used by private security agencies in 
public spaces. Do these PSC provide security? A study on crime trends in Bulgaria, 
conducted by the Centre for the Study of Democracy, shows a positive correlation 
between decreases in crime against businesses and the presence of PSC73. This can 
be explained by the number of businesses that bought alarm systems from PSC 
between 1999 and 2005. The public police also provided alarm systems, but with 
lesser success: the study reports that only 18% of businesses in Sofia bought their 
alarm systems from the police74.
 8. Conclusion
In this article, we contributed to the debate on ‘plural policing’ in Europe, focus-
ing particularly on Bulgaria, a country in transition. Bulgaria, having only very 
68 Defined by Article 5, paragraph 1, subparagraphs 1, 2 and 4, of the Law on Private Security Activity.
69 Defined by Article 5, paragraph 1, subparagraph 2, of the Law on Private Security Activity.
70 According to the official reply from the Ministry of the Interior, only one PSC based in Sofia and 
functioning within the territory of Bulgaria is licensed to perform in all domains, including self-
defence.
71 In the course of using the above-mentioned tools, guards are obliged to protect the health and 
life of the individuals against whom such tools are used. Guards can use auxiliary tools only after 
giving a warning (except in cases where they are attacked suddenly). The Law prohibits the use 
of handcuffs or truncheons on juveniles and pregnant women (Law on Private Security Activity, 
Article 34, paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 5).
72 Article 35 of the Law on Private Security Activity.
73 Crime Trends in Bulgaria (2000–2005), Centre for the Study of Democracy.
74 http://www.csd.bg/fileSrc.php?id=1800 and http://www.mvr.bg/NR/rdonlyres/BB205E93-73C7-
4709-811D-F687981E8662/0/ZCHOD.pdf
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recently become a member of the EU Commission, and possessing a very new 
democratic government, is still a country in evolution. Based on an extensive 
search for information and data on policing in Sofia, we conclude that Bulgaria is 
characterised by a lack of available scholarly and societal (policy-based) informa-
tion on police and security issues. The contrast between the accessibility of sources 
focusing on demographical, political, historical and societal topics and the lack of 
accessibility of information on the (functioning) of the police couldn’t be greater. 
After several attempts at accessing this information, it was provided to us by the 
Ministry of the Interior and by the National Police Directorate itself. However, 
the fact that these official institutions were our main sources of information leads 
us to question whether distortions or overly narrow views of situational realities 
were present in the data. This leads us in turn to desire a more in-depth study, 
conducted within the city itself, which would include the possibility of visiting 
the relevant agencies and interviewing key experts. Anyhow, this article has its 
merits, in that it reveals some first insights into policing security in Sofia, and 
offers some potentially challenging debate topics. We will first discuss our conclu-
sions regarding the national police force, and then continue with our conclusions 
regarding local issues.
 8.1. National police force
In Bulgaria, in contrast to other EU countries, security issues have never been very 
high on the political agenda. Bulgaria has yet, in 2013, to face mass protests of 
dissatisfaction and anger with the governmental system and its corrupt practices. 
The national police force is used to quell these manifestations and to keep the 
public order. The nature of this police force, stemming as it does from a central-
ised, hierarchical, militarised national police force, has, at first glance, not evolved 
dramatically. Further in-depth research is needed to analyse this statement. For the 
national police force, which originated historically from a ‘military-bureaucratic 
police model’ (Ponsaers, 2001) called the ‘People’s Militia’, and which operated 
under the dominion of a Communist regime for 35 years, taking any steps towards 
a community-oriented police model (a model that is present in almost all Western 
countries) is tremendous. The police system in Bulgaria is still centralised and was, 
until very recently (2013), governed and financed by the Ministry of the Interior. The 
national force (the National Police General Directorate) operates on the national 
level as well as being territorially divided into 28 different regional departments. 
One of these regional departments is the Municipal Police unit which operates in 
Sofia and continues to execute the regulations and priorities that are established 
by the Ministry of the Interior.
We discussed in this article a very important recent trend. While the Law of 
the Ministry of the Interior provides this Ministry with overwhelming supervisory 
powers over all police components, the Ministry has recently lost these powers 
to intelligence services. The above-mentioned directorates are no longer part of 
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the Ministry of the Interior, but will be supervised and financed from 2014 on75 
by the National Security Agency, an intelligence department charged with protecting 
the country’s borders and dealing with threats to internal security. These are very 
challenging evolutions that need to be accompanied by scientific research and 
transparency in publications. The division between the national police which 
continue to be governed by the Ministry of the Interior and the police officers who 
operate within the new intelligence services is not clear, nor are the identities of 
the controlling agencies or oversight bodies that will have authority over this new 
National Security Agency. Drawing conclusions from these new arrangements, 
we notice a shift of state police functions towards an intelligence agency; they 
are no longer operating under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior nor 
being controlled by it.
On the other hand, in the course of attempting to answer our research questions, 
we have noticed a simultaneous evolution towards decentralisation and privatisation, 
which is more evident at the local level in Sofia.
 8.2. Plural policing on the local level
Although we noticed some trends towards decentralisation within regional govern-
ments (trends towards greater autonomy of the police forces), the regions are not 
well organised yet, and we did not notice any visible effects stemming from these 
trends. On the local level, however, we did notice more marked tendencies towards 
‘plural policing’, and in particular towards privatisation. We could offer criticisms 
of the overlap among public order tasks that are assigned to different units, as well 
as the overlap between the ‘Metropolitan’ department and the Municipal Police unit, 
both of which operate within the territory of the city. Although the mayor, who is 
responsible for peace, order and security in Sofia, can count on the national public 
police to execute municipal tasks, we also see tensions within this police system. 
As long as police management, control and budget are determined at the national 
level, we can’t label this public police force as ‘deconcentrated’. As we have described, 
the mayor can co-operate and be consulted by public police,  but has no hierarchical 
power to impose police priorities, tasks or activities, abilities which are necessary 
for good city governance. She has to rely on additional municipal budgets, drawn 
from revenues provided by the citizens of Sofia, in order to execute his or her own 
priorities on the city level. Article 18, paragraph 3 from the Law of the Ministry 
of the Interior also shows that the mayor’s orders with regards to security can be 
revoked if directors of Regional Police Directorates do not agree with them.
We notice a legal and practical tension here, as the Law for local self-governance 
and local administration76 postulates that directors of local law enforcement 
must abide by the mayor’s orders. Although legally in authority, in practice the 
75 Reforms in this structure will be accompanied by changes to the current Law on the Ministry of 
the Interior (and to the statute for its application); these will be effected via a new bill which has 
yet to be voted on in Parliament (a vote is foreseen for September 2014).
76 Article 44 of the Law for local self-governance and local administration.
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mayor does not have any supervisory powers over the public police, nor does 
she decide on the budgets that are to be spent on security issues within the city. 
Tensions between decision making based on the implementation costs of state 
functions (such as public police in the city who are financed by the state77) and 
decision making based on the municipal budget (drawn from local sources of 
revenue78) can arise. The mayor him/herself is responsible for the organisation 
and implementation of the independent municipal budget79. In this sense, the 
mayor has no authority over the budgets of local law enforcement agencies80, 
and he or she must rely on their voluntary compliance in order to complete 
necessary security tasks.
We assume that due to these conflicts of authority, security privatisation emerged 
in Sofia, manifested by an increasing number of contracts made between the mayor 
and private security companies on safety issues. Although minimal legislation 
overseeing these PSC was installed in 2000, without regular controls on licenses 
and background checks of employees hired by PSC, possible problems of legitimacy 
can arise. In particular, regarding this last trend, we need more in-depth research, 
and much more scholarly work, in order to evaluate the plural policing processes 
within Sofia.
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